Institutional capacity is a technical term that is commonly used by political scientists to emphasize ability of state institutions to achieve objectives, adapt required reforms, solve problems or accommodate with new political status quo. Having a strong institutional capacity is very important for politicians to transform states because in the absence of institutional capacity their innovative ideas will not work due to absence of people who can implement these ideas. Analogically, if political elites considered as brain, absence of institutional capacity means having no hands to implement brain orders.
Since 2002 after Justice and Development Party (AKP) has become the government party, institutional capacity has always been a problem for Turkey. The major reason behind this problem was AKP did not prefer a merit based human resources system during these years. Instead, they relied on selection of state officials for their ideology or identity.
During the first years of its governance, Kemalist political elite was much stronger in state institutions. These officials were not happy with AKP ideology and policies. They generally dragged their feet to AKP requirements. Therefore, government authorities look for an another group of state officials who could be much cooperative implementing AKP policies.
In this respect, the Gulenists found the window of opportunity to replace their recruits to the senior state positions those were occupied by Kemalist state elite. Gulenists, in comparison to the other groups have enough manipulative power to convince AKP Government. They used every opportunity to manipulate Erdogan and his companions that there is an imminent military coup threat that will step down them from government. They used Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases to eliminate rival civil servants and supported 2010 Constitutional changes to control Turkish Judiciary. By 2011, they penetrated almost every state institution and they forced AKP to share its parliamentary power with them.
While Gulenists implementing their strategy, AKP was not innocent for giving them this opportunity. Erdogan’s passion to work with religious state officials provide Gulenists to use this tool. Gulenists were religious like AKP politicians and they seem fighting for a holly purpose. Furthermore, Erdogan wants a bureaucracy who is loyal to him after having difficulties with Kemalist officials. In this sense, Erdogan assumed Gulenists can be controlled through their leaders which was seen as an opportunity by him to control bureaucracy.
However, things did not go well according to Erdogan’s expectations. When Gulenists thought that they have enough power to control state and AKP did not compromise to share power with them, they wage a new war this time targeting Erdogan and the AKP. First, they used 17-25 December corruption investigations to undermine Erdogan and his cabinet. These investigations have started just a few months before municipality elections in Turkey. Despite these investigations, AKP won enough municipalities to repel Gulenists attacks and Government started investigations to dismiss Gulenists officials.
Since 17-25 December 2013, by wining general and presidential elections the power asymmetry between AKP and Gulenists improved in favour of the AKP. Erdogan and the AKP consolidated their power and Gulenists lost their influence not only on Turkish society but also on majority of their enthusiastic followers. When security authorities found new evidences that reveals hidden Gulenists in state institutions, 15 July bloody military coup attempt steered by them as a last resort to keep their existing networks.
After the military coup attempt, AKP again started to look for another group of state officials to replace Gulenists who will not betray President and Government. This time selection of senior officials was much complicated than earlier years. If AKP assigns Kemalist officials, it will face similar problems those experienced in its earlier years of government. If they rely on another religious sect, they might abuse their authority as similar to Gulenists as soon as they gain power in state institutions. Furthermore, conservative officers carrying risks that they might still have links with Gulenists who have identity problem. Therefore, AKP seems to head towards state officials who are linked with Nationalist Party. These state officials much secure for Government because most of them do not fancy with Gulenists who will not undermine investigations against Gulenists. Moreover, current political status quo provides many opportunities for these officials to be promoted to senior state positions even they did not experience it while Nationalist Party was part of coalition government in the period 1999-2002. However, relying on again another group of state officials who are selected only for their ideology or identity will not help AKP to accomplish its 2023 targets.
During the age of innovation, Turkish Presidency and Government needs state officials who could add a value to Turkey’s interests. Having a particular identity (nationalist or conservative) or loyalty is not enough to fulfil Turkey’s future expectations. If AKP is aiming to promote Turkey in international environment and to reach its 2023 targets, merit criteria must put into practise for employing state officials. If such a human resources management can be accomplished, many talented people from different parts of society will find an opportunity to work within state institutions. These people will have a sense of belonging to Turkish state and no religious or ideological group will aggregate in state institutions to control that organisation. Furthermore, if merit based system can put into practise, there will be competition among state officials and competition will lead to survival of fittest environment which end up with better institutional capacity of Turkish State Institutions.
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